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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 34a-2-801(8) (a) (1997), U.C.A. §78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1996) and 
U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(l) (1997) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Wilner A. Blakely ("Blakely") failed to marshall 
evidence in support of the Utah Labor Commission's ("Commission") 
finding that there was no medical causation barring appellate 
review of the Commission's finding? 
Standard of Review: The failure to marshall evidence in 
support of the Commission's findings is an issue only addressed 
on appeal, therefore, there is no applicable standard of review. 
2. Whether there was substantial evidence in support of the 
Commission's conclusion that Blakely failed to establish medical 
causation? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review of Utah Labor 
Commission determination is stated in Utah Code Annotated Section 
63-36b-16(4) (g) (1997) which provides in relevant part: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: . . . 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidencetwhen viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court; 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-46b-16 (1997) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Blakely claims workers' compensation benefits allegedly 
arising out of his work for Salt Lake County ("the County") as a 
van driver transporting the elderly. Blakely contends he 
sustained blisters and ulcers on his feet, which resulted in 
partial amputation of both feet, as a result of entering and 
exiting the van on two separate November days in 1994 and 1995. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On April 30, 1996 Blakely filed an Application for Hearing 
with the Industrial Commission of Utah. [R. 2]. On May 16, 1996 
Salt Lake County filed an Answer to Blakely's Application for 
Hearing. [R. 14]. A hearing was held on January 23, 1997 before 
Administrative Law Judge Barbara Elicerio ("the ALJ"). [R.27, R. 
716] . 
On May 8, 1997 the ALJ appointed a medical panel to evaluate 
the medical issues involved in Blakely's claims. [R. 696-697]. 
The ALJ asked the panel to address, among other questions: 
1. Is there a medically demonstrable, causal 
connection between the petitioner's foot ulcers and 
amputations and his work as a van driver during 1994 
and 1995? 
[R. 696]. 
On June 9, 1997 the medical panel responded to the ALJ's 
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request and concluded that: "There is not a medically 
demonstrable causal connection between the petitioner's foot 
ulcers and amputations and his work as a van driver during 1994 
and 1995 . . ." [R. 713]. On July 14, 1997 the ALJ provided 
notice to the parties of the Medical Panel Report. [R. 715]. 
On October 14, 1997 the ALJ, in a written decision, ruled 
that Blakely's claim was non compensable because Blakely failed 
to establish that the work activity was the medical cause of his 
injuries. [R. 725]. Blakely filed a "request for review" on 
November 10, 1997. [R. 728]. The County filed a Response to 
Motion for Review on December 11, 1997. [R. 787]. On March 19, 
1998 the Utah Labor Commission issued an Order Denying Motion for 
Review. [R. 789-790]. The Utah Labor Commission ("the 
Commission") concluded that: 
[t]he Labor Commission agrees with the ALJ's 
determination that the medical panel's report is 
persuasive on the issue of medical causation. Because 
Mr. Blakely has failed to establish medical causation, 
his claim for workers' compensation benefits must be 
denied. 
[R. 789]. 
On April 1, 1998 Blakely filed a document requesting the 
Commission reconsider its Order. [R. 791]. On April 30, 1998 the 
Commission issued an Order Denying Request for Reconsideration. 
[R. 794]. On May 20, 1998 Blakely filed a Petition for Review of 
Utah Labor Commission's Order with the Utah Court of Appeals. [R. 
797-798]. 
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C. Disposition in the Utah Labor Commission. 
After a hearing and referral to a medical panel the ALJ 
denied Blakely's claim for workers' compensation benefits based 
on his failure to establish medical causation. The Commission 
twice affirmed the ALJ's finding on medical causation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Salt Lake County Employment. 
1. Blakely was working for Salt Lake County in May of 1994 
as a van driver transporting senior citizens to and from the 
Friendly Neighborhood Seniors Center. [R. 838-839]. 
2. Blakely drove a Ford Van which provided sufficient room 
for him to enter and exit the vehicle without difficulty. [R. 
843] . 
3. However, in November of 1994 the County assigned Blakely 
a new Dodge Van which had less room for him to enter and exit. 
Blakely found it more difficult to enter and exit this vehicle 
[879-880]. 
4. Blakely had to twist out of his seat with his feat to 
get out of the van. [R. 843]. 
5. After an unusually busy November 1994 workday Blakely 
testified that he noticed a blister on each foot. [838, 839, 
840] . 
6. Sometime after he noticed the blisters, Blakely sought 
treatment at the VA Hospital. [204, 206, 846]. 
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7. Blakely's condition worsened and on December 22, 1994 
physicians at the Veterans Administration ("VA") Hospital 
amputated his great right toe. [846]. 
8. Blakely was discharged on December 24, 1994, but in June 
of 1995 his left great toe was amputated due to further 
complications. [846-848] . 
9. Blakely returned to work for the County in September of 
1995. The County assigned Blakely a large van with more room. 
[R. 851]. 
10. Due to a scheduling mistake, Blakely was again assigned 
to the smaller Dodge Van in November of 1995. [R. 852, 879]. 
11. Again, during a busy day, Blakely claims he suffered 
further blisters. [R. 852]. 
12. On March 29, 1996 the VA Hospital performed a partial 
amputation of the right foot. [R. 852]. 
B. Pre-existing Conditions. 
13. Prior to working for the County, Blakely had a nearly 
twenty year history of diabetes. [R. 206]. 
14. Blakely began insulin injections in 1991. [R. 167]. 
15. Blakely regularly visited the podiatry department of 
the VA Hospital for ten years prior to the alleged County 
accident. [R. 858]. 
16. At the hearing, Blakely conceded that prior to his 
alleged County injury he had a lack of feeling in his feet, 
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circulation problems and some numbness. [862-863]. 
17. Blakely checked his feet for sores or other problems 
every night, although he claimed not to recall any sores on his 
feet prior to 1994. [R. 858, 859]. 
18. Medical records indicate Blakely had prior problems 
with his feet. [R. 194, 197, 189]. 
19. Medical records also indicate prior use of tobacco and 
non compliance with diabetic diet. [R. 165, 168] 
C. Course of Medical Treatment. 
20. Although the alleged industrial event was approximated 
at November 17, 1994, the medical records indicate Blakely did 
not appear for treatment until December 12, 1994. [R. 204, 206]. 
21. On December 22, 1994 Blakely's right great toe was 
amputated at the VA Hospital. [R. 215-216]. 
22. On June 13, 1995 Blakely had additional surgery on his 
foot. [R. 275-276]. 
23. On March 26, 1996, Blakely had a partial amputation of 
the right foot and a resection of the Achilles tendon. [R. 680-
682] . 
24. In support of Blakely's claim, Dr. Moritz wrote a note 
which reads: 
Mr. Blakely is a patient under my care. He currently 
has an open wound to his right plantar foot. 
This happened due to driving a van for aging center, 
when Mr. Blakely stood up and pivoted on right foot, he 
broke open an ulcer to planar sub 2nd and 3rd metarsac 
phallangiac joint. 
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If you have any questions please call . . . 
[R. 321] . 
25. On April 9, 1996, R. Kelley Thueson, M.D., at the 
County's request, issued a report based on his examination of 
Blakely and his medical records. [R. 328-333]. 
26. Dr. Thueson concluded that "[t]he events which occurred 
to Mr. Blakely are because of his underlying diabetes, not 
because of his job assignment." [R. 332]. 
27. On June 9, 1997 the medical panel commissioned by the 
ALJ, based on its examination of Blakely and a review of his 
medical records, concluded as follows: "There is not a medically 
demonstrable causal connection between the petitioner's foot 
ulcers and amputations and his work as a van driver during 1994 
and 1995 . . . ." [R. 713]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Blakely failed to marshall the evidence in support of the 
Commission's findings, as required by Utah case law. Given 
Blakely's failure to marshall the evidence, this Court should 
refrain from conducting its own review of the record to determine 
whether the Commission's findings were based on substantial 
evidence. 
Even if this Court were to conduct its own review of the 
record, it would find the Commission's findings based on 
substantial evidence. There was substantial evidence that 
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Blakely's work activities were not the medical cause of his 
injuries. The Commission had before it evidence of Blakely's 
work activities, his extensive prior medical problems with 
diabetes as well as the medical opinions of a physician and 
medical panel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BLAKELY FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT HE FAILED TO ESTABLISH MEDICAL 
CAUSATION. 
Even with the latitude customarily provided pro se 
litigants, the Court should reject Blakely's appeal based on his 
failure to marshall all the evidence in support of the 
Commission's findings. See Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 
820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991)("Although this Court has generally 
been more lenient with pro se litigants and applied established 
fundamental rules of law in favor of a litigant who has not 
presented them with the precision of an attorney, it would 
nevertheless be beyond our role as judges to become advocates for 
a pro se party. . . . This Court will not, therefore, address 
[pro se litigant's arguments] because it is totally unsupported 
by legal analysis or authority.") and State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 
50, 55 (Utah 1993) (refusing to address issues for, among other 
reasons, failure of pro se litigant to marshall evidence in 
support of arguments). 
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The Utah Court of Appeals has stated, that xxa party 
challenging the Board's 1 findings of fact must marshal! alJ " >1 
the evidencr sucrorfina * r.~ findings -•.:*•': sh-"-w that despite the 
supporting raci.-, or, _.,.* ui *::.•• . . . . \.: -..J 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
s u b s t a i 11 i a I e i :i :i e i 1 c e G r a c e D r i 11 i i i g * B o a r d o f Re v i e w, 7 7 6 
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(emphasis original). See also 
Heinecke Pep t. of Commerce 81 0 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993 ) • • 
Aoolving this rule of law in a workers' compensation case, 
this Court rejected an employers challenge t 
Commission'^ findings In Intermountain Health v. Bd, of Review, 
839 L ._u I ) . 
Commission ruling, the employer failed to marshal.: + ne evidence. 
Id. *v • * • to marshall, this 
Court declined to go iorwara and examine whether the Industrial 
Com~ "ion oruer was, ii I fa,/ ::t rupoorted by substantial evidence. 
This Court stated: "Since II 1C 1 i<. . ...__ec; zo comply 
marshaling requirement b: this case, we have no occasion to 
consider cn^- >_ . :--•: • -,: poi t IA^\ il , j»< » J . L t i bl iii 84 
In the instant case, Blakely has failed to marshall the 
1
 Grace Drilling involved a challenge to an Industrial 
Commission award of unemployment compensation benefits. However, 
the same marshaling requirement applies to claims for workers' 
compensation benefits. Intermountain Health v. Bd. of Review, 
839 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
S 
evidence in support of the Commission's Order. Blakely simply 
argues against the conclusions of the medical panel, the ALJ and 
other medical records in his brief. [Blakely Brief, 6-14] . He 
does not, as required, marshall all evidence in support of the 
Commission's findings, and then explain why this evidence fails 
to provide substantial evidence in support of the Commission's 
findings. Evidence in support of the Commission's findings is 
addressed in Point II. Accordingly, this Court should "decline 
to disturb the findings made by the ALJ and ratified by the 
Industrial Commission." Intermountain Health, 839 P.2d at 844. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT BLAKELY FAILED TO PROVE THAT HIS 
WORK WAS THE MEDICAL CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES IS SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The Commission's finding that Blakely failed to 
establish that his work was the medical cause of his injuries is 
supported by substantial evidence contained in the record. The 
record contains (1) Blakely's testimony concerning the nature of 
his work activities [R. 839-845]; (2) Blakely's testimony about 
his pre-existing problems [R. 862-863]; (3) corroborating medical 
records of Blakely's pre-existing conditions [R. 32-203]; (4) the 
medical report of Dr. Thueson opining there was not medical 
causation [R. 328-333]; and (5) the Medical Panel Report opining 
there was not medical causation [R. 710-714]. 
The statutory basis for reviewing a Commission order is 
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stated in Utah Code Annotated Section 63-36b-16(4) (g)(1997). 
This provision reads: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, • : i 1 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: . . . 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination o± 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court; 
"F-- -:emanas inat petitioner prove his 
disability is medicaliy '.he ^ ^ i u of an exertion or :;\ _^:: ;_:^ t 
occurred dur::" :~r L" - related a^rivi^4 Chase v. Industrial 
Commission, c _ . . _* .1 
quotation^ *nd -itations onuv.ro . Another statement of tne r-le 
is t . • • r 
otherwise that r lie stress, strain, -xert : '^n required by his or 
. .:
 ¥
 injury UL disability." nllen 
v. Industrial Commission, 7/^ r.^u 1 c, 2n /T74-?.h 1QQ' . further, 
1
 -dical causation i s an i ssi le of fact7'' and this Court 
"review [s] the Commission'' s findings under the substai i tial 
evidence standard." Chase, 872 P. 2d at: 479. 
"Substdii t J . i 1 ^VIJMI. t i, MI Ii i l,jvii.f '.ld^i'i.'* i a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
c onc 1 I is:i c: i :i I d ubstantial evidence is more than 
a mere scintilla of evidence though something less than the 
weight of the evidence." Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 
11 
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
In the instant case, the Commission's finding that Blakely 
failed to establish medical causation is supported by the 
following substantial evidence contained in the record. 
A. Blakely7s work activities. 
Blakely's described the mechanism which allegedly caused his 
injury as follows: 
My feet would be — I would remove them off of the, off 
the gas and off of all pedals, place them on the floor 
— which you can't even do with this shoe on now, but I 
could at the time because it had flex in it. You place 
them on the floor. And then I — because — and then I 
would press back against the seat. And I would twist 
like this and twist my feet like this. And then I get 
them out from under the steering wheel, then I could 
step down on the step. 
Q. Uh-huh? 
A. You just couldn't move your feet freely without 
having pressure against them. And with that pressure I 
twisted a blister on both feet. 
Q. Okay. Now did you -- your feet were pressed 
against the floor of the van or, or -- is that what you 
said? 
A. Yeah, the floor of the van, uh-huh (affirmative) 
Q. Okay. 
A. Yeah. They would be — you would be pushing to get 
your body out. 
[R. 843-844]. 
The ALJ attempted to get some clarification of Blakely's 
work activities: 
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Q. Okay. What part of the foot then would get pressed 
against the floor of the van? 
A. Well, the bottom « •.;~ pressed against the 
bottom of the floor. 
Q, An d your f e e t w e r e f ] a t : i 1 11: i • = • f ] : • : • i 11: i e i 1 y c i 1 \ i e i: e 
twisting? 
A. Well, yeah, they would be as flat as you could, ci;. 
you could be. And then as you twisted and then you --
why it would come over to the side of your foot. 
Q, uh huh. 
A. Arid then you would twist all the way the rest of 
the way out, to where you get them back out under the 
steering wheel, because this part of your body had to 
go under the steering wheel, till you get them, out and 
down on the step. 
Q. But the blisters that you had 01 1 you had one on 
your right foot, one on, your left foot. They were both 
on the inside of the feet, is that right? 
A. Yeah, they were on the -- up here, like this. 
Because of the pressure, you know, you/',re going out 
left. 
Q. They were both on the big toe. So they were both 
• on the inside? 
Q. Yeah, the big toes were -- close to the big toes. 
They were on the side where you would -- where the 
pressure points when you would make yon i,r move out. 
[R. 844-845]. 
Comment i U'i I'II.II* I , " > 'I'1 « i i|'l- PUI, the ALJ found that >xthe 
conclusion regarding the lack of contribution, from the work to be 
J ogl c .a 1 , considering the difficulty * u understanding how any 
significant trauma occurred, [ s ic; j nase on • •.-- mecl lai i„:i cs : £ tl le 
work exposure testified to by the petitioner " [R. 725]. 
1 3 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[e]vidence of the 
ordinariness or usualness of the employee's exertions may be 
relevant to the medical conclusion of causation. Where the 
injury results from latent symptoms with an illness such as hear 
disease, proof of medical causation may be especially difficult. 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 27 n. 9. 
B. Blakely's pre-existing conditions. 
The medical records indicated that Blakely had a long 
history of diabetes before his employment with Salt Lake County. 
[R. 33][medical record of June 29, 1984 indicating history of 
diabetes] . In fact, Blakely admitted he was diabetic and had 
regularly received treatment for his diabetes. Blakely testifie 
on cross-examination: 
A. . . . I talked about the Ureacin that they had me 
use on my feet every night and morning. I talked about 
the medication that I took. And the recommendation 
that I followed for diet. 
THE COURT: Now, let me just ask you for a clarification 
on that, Mr. Blakely. Was that prior to the time that 
you had any problems, you were advised to do those 
things with your feet? 
THE WITNESS: Oh, yeah. I have been going to the 
podiatry department at the VA Hospital for ten years 
every three months. And all they ever had to treat my 
at that time, which they do on a diabetic, was trim my 
toenails. 
THE WITNESS: . . . You have a diabetic clinic that you 
go to; you have a podiatry clinic that you go to; you 
have an eye clinic you go to. I mean, that's part of 
the total treatment. And I have been doing that for 
14 
years. 
[R. 858-859] 
The medical records indicate Blakely had prior foot 
problems. In a January <-•],. - . - ~ed 
that "diabetic footcare Hx [history] of L [left] Hallux [big toe] 
ulcer, [ i i i 11 ' I , 19 94 
indicates ; Mpreulcerative lesion" v J : • I I t , .- .  ,°'7"1 . It i s 
• '--. " r .^e from left Hallux" in a medical 
record dated September 9, 19 93. [R. 
C" . Thueson's report. 
After examining Blakely and reviewing his medical records, 
Dr. Thueson concluded that M[f]oot problems are a common 
c omp 1 i c a t i o n f o r t hose s u f f e r :i i i g :i :i a b e t e s I 
ulcerations, subsequent infections, and required surgeries are 
directly r.elctL«-M I i I I L a b e l s , . " [ r i '. 1 | i"n Tin ieson also 
states that " [ i]n my opinion, it is unlikely that assigning a 
different voh i l> I Mi ':ixaminee would have had much bearing on 
the outcome of his diabetic foot problem." [R. 331]. 
Addressing Blakely's surgeries, Dr Thueson stated that "I 
believe all surgeries performed • : i: i t: 1: Ie e • xai n :i i iee w e r e i iecessa ry, 
and due to his underlying diabetic condition, and had little to 
c-: • i I I i hi leupons- . • e examinee had 
documented lower extremity neuropatis ±i. 1 >.\ with his first 
repor ted foo t i nfection and ulceration _i_n -L_/J3, well before the 
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examinee's reported job injury." [R. 331-332]. 
D. The Medical Panel Report. 
The Medical Panel, consisting of Drs. Thomas and Clarke, 
concluded that "[tjhere is not a medically demonstrable causal 
connection between the petitioner's foot ulcers and amputations 
and his work as a van driver during 1994 and 1995 . . ." [R. 
713]2. 
The Medical Panel explained: 
It is apparent to the panel that the petitioner had 
multiple factors which must be considered in relation 
to causation of his foot ulcers. He had long-standing 
poorly regulated diabetes. He had an extensive history 
of use of alcohol, which contributes to neuropathy. He 
has been obese, which adds to the potential trauma to 
the feet. He had a long history of smoking, which 
contributes to vascular disease. He had 
hypercholesteremia, which also contributes to vascular 
disease. He had extensive prior recording of symptoms 
of neuropathy, and prior indication of vascular 
susceptibility and need for special care and treatment. 
[R. 713]. 
E. Summary of Evidence. 
Based on the above-stated evidence, the Commission concluded 
that Blakely failed to establish that his work activities were 
the cause of his medical problems. 
The Commission had before it Blakely's account of the 
2
 The only medical evidence in support of Blakely's claim 
is a handwritten note from Dr. Mark Moritz stating that Blakely 
"currently has an open wound to his right plantar foot. This 
happened . . . driving a van for aging center, when Mr. Blakely 
stood up and pivoted on right foot, he broke open an ulcer to 
plannar sub 2nd and 3rd metatarsal phallangial joint." [R. 321], 
16 
mechanism for hi s injury. Blakely's account was vague, ambiguous 
and confused. F r orri t h is account, t h «= I onirril: :::: : I o i \ c o i i J d r a t i o i i a J ] y 
infer, with the other evidence, that this activity was not the 
medical cause c • f BJ akeJ y s :i i 1 ji :i i:y. 
The Commission had before it evidence of Blakely's iong-
stai id:i i 1 g ba I:t] = \ i:i 11: i :i :i abetes - -".3 evidence t h a ~ " floor 
problems are common complications tui those suffering ciaoere.. . 
[ R 3 31 ] Combine this with the fact that P.. akely had prior 
problems with his feet, [R 1 89, ~ _,dr.^
 : 
compliance with diabetes treatment, 'r. "-"99-702]. Further, the 
medical recorai .,::_ IT.-..•- _, .: 
mid-December, several weeks after the alleged injury causing 
Finally, *ne Commission had the report of both the County's 
L :.\ t he Medical Panel finding no medical 
causatic: stated above, the Medical Panel noted multiple 
contributor" factor.0 whi ch led to Blakely's foot problems, 
including nistory c: obesity, smoking UJ<I [ 1. I y .ululated 
diabetes. [R. 713]. 
1 evidence in 
favor of the Commission's f m a m g an ; tne Commission was well 
within it1, purview in finding against Blakely's claim of medical 
] ; 
causation3. 
CONCLUSION 
Blakely failed to marshall the evidence in support of the 
Commission's finding of fact that his work activities were not 
the cause of his medical problems. Accordingly, the Court should 
not conduct its own review of the record. 
Even if this Court were to undertake such a review, there is 
substantial evidence in support of the Commission's findings. 
Salt Lake County requests the Court to affirm the Commission's 
Order. 
DATED this A ^ day of Jjfl/ (A% j ^ 1998. 
OFFICE OF COUNTY LEQAL COUNSEL 
/I 
Patrick F. Holden 
County Legal Counsel 
Attorneys for Respondent Salt Lake 
County 
3
 Blakely raises a number of issues in the statement of 
issues section of his brief. [Blakely Brief, 4-5]. However, the 
County notes that Blakely failed to brief these issues and 
therefore, should not be addressed. See State v. Jennings, 875 
P.2d 566, 569 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (declining to address issues 
listed in statement of issues due to "no legal analysis or 
authority stated for these issues . . . " ) . 
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ADDENDUM 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
WILNER BLAKELEY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY (SELF-
INSURED) , 
Respondent. 
Case No. 96413 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
January 23, 1997 at 3:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing 
was pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The petitioner represented himself. 
The respondent was represented by Jay Stone, 
Attorney. 
This case involves a claim for workers compensation benefits 
related to partial toe/foot amputations that the petitioner 
underwent in December 1994, June 1995 and March 1996. The 
petitioner claims that these amputations were necessary as a result 
of aggravation to pre-existing diabetic neuropathy in his feet, 
caused by excessive rubbing/pressure on his feet at work in 
November 1994 and November 1995. The petitioner claims that the 
excessive rubbing/pressure occurred, due to exaggerated positions 
that became necessary, in order for him to get into, and out of, 
the driver,s seat of the work van that he drove. In support of his 
position, the petitioner has submitted the opinion of his treating 
podiatrist, Dr. M. Moritz. Dr. Moritz states that the petitioner's 
right foot ulceration (leading to the March 1996 amputation) was 
caused, or aggravated, by his work as a van driver. The respondent 
does not contest that the petitioner was required to drive a van 
with limited space between the driver seat and the steering wheel 
in November 1994 and November 1995. However, the respondent 
contends that the petitioner's claim is non-compensable, because he 
has pre-existing diabetic neuropathy and: 1) this is the medical 
cause of his foot ulcerations and subsequent amputations, not his 
work as a van driver (per the opinion of Dr. R. Thueson, the 
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respondent's chosen physician), and 2) the petitioner's work as a 
van driver did not involve unusual exertion, so that it fails to 
meet the legal cause standard, applicable where there is a 
contributory pre-existing condition. 
At hearing, the ALJ noted that there was a medical causal 
controversy, as between the opinions of Dr. M. Moritz and Dr. R. 
Thueson. The ALJ indicated that she would therefore refer the 
medical controversy to a medical panel for additional input on the 
issue. The ALJ indicated"that she would address the legal cause 
determination, if necessary, in any final order to be issued. At 
hearing, the petitioner provided testimony, primarily related to 
his work duties and exposure during 1994 and 1995. A medical 
record exhibit was admitted (Exhibit D-l) which contains the only 
information submitted with respect to the petitioner's pre-injury 
medical history. The matter was referred to the medical panel on 
May 8, 1997 and the panel report was received at the Commission on 
July 9, 1997. The report was distributed to the parties on July 
14, 1997, with 15 days allowed for the filing of objections. No 
objections were filed and the matter was therefore considered ready 
for order as of July 29, 1997. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The first medical records, chronologically, involve a June 
1984 admission to the VA Hospital in Boise, Idaho, primarily to 
deal with cardiac problems, but incidentally also describing the 
petitioner's diabetic status as well. Noted was the fact that the 
petitioner had type II diabetes for 14 years at that point. With 
respect to his diabetes, it was noted that he had had intermittent 
treatment for the disease with oral medication over the past 14 
years. It was noted that he had been instructed in glucose 
monitoring, but didn't do it. It was also noted that the 
petitioner had been through diabetic instruction, but had a poor 
understanding of his disease and had been poorly compliant with a 
diabetic diet. He was informed, at that time, that it was possible 
for him to control his diet and get off diabinese as a result. 
Medical records for 1986 through 1991 show generally poor 
compliance with a diabetic diet and oral medication for his 
diabetes. He was finally placed on insulin in 1991 and apparently 
had better control of his blood sugar thereafter, but this is not 
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always clear in the records. Numbness in the legs and feet are 
noted in a number of the records during this time frame, with some 
attention given to caring for the feet. 
In May 1989, the petitioner was admitted to the VA Hospital 
due to persistent vision problems. With respect to his diabetes, 
it was noted that he had a 5-year history of diabetic neuropathy at 
that time. The petitioner's blood sugars were noted to be in the 
250-350 range. It was noted that, during this hospitalization, the 
petitioner was non-compliant with the diabetic diet provided him 
and that he kept slipping out to eat ice cream and candy bars. The 
hospital records indicate that the petitioner was given additional 
instruction regarding the results of uncontrolled diabetes. 
From 1989 through 1994, the petitioner was seen regularly 
at the VA Hospital for diabetic related concerns. Poor compliance 
with dietary requirements and poor monitoring of his blood sugar 
were often noted, with some notations simply indicating that his 
diabetes was poorly controlled. As noted above, the petitioner was 
begun on insulin injections in 1991. The petitioner also began 
regular visits to the podiatrist during this 5-year period. 
Symptoms in the legs and feet were often noted, with note of pre-
ulcerative lesions and ulcers noted in 1994. 
At hearing, the petitioner conceded that he had sensation 
problems, circulation problems and some numbness in his feet prior 
to November 1994, when he began driving the van for Salt Lake 
County. He conceded that, as a result of his diabetes, he was 
under doctor instructions to take very special care of his feet, 
using Eucerin lotion every night on them and checking them 
constantly for any sores or other problems. He admitted to having 
podiatry clinic visits going back 10 years prior to November 1994, 
under the VA plan for total diabetic care. However, he recalls no 
actual ulcers on his feet prior to November 1994. 
After working several volunteer-type jobs with senior 
centers in 1993-94, in May 1994, the petitioner was hired under a 
"Title 5" training program to drive a van transporting seniors from 
their homes to the Friendly Neighborhood Senior Center. This job 
averaged 20 hours of work per week and the petitioner was paid 
$6.60/hour. The petitioner would drive to the seniors homes, using 
a list of addresses he was provided, and he would pick the seniors 
up and assist them in getting into the van. When he had picked up 
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all on the list, or when the van was full, he would drive to the 
senior center and again assist the seniors out of the van and into 
the center- Later in the day, when the seniors were ready to go 
home, he would do the work in reverse order, taking the seniors 
back to their homes. The petitioner stated that the vans he drove 
held 13-14 people. 
Per the petitioner, he began by driving a Ford van which had 
plenty of room for him in between the driver seat and the steering 
wheel. However, in November 1994, he was assigned a new Dodge van 
to drive, which had minimal room in between the driver seat and the 
steering wheel, with no tilt function on the steering wheel. The 
petitioner testified that his own personal car has a tilt function 
on the steering wheel, which allows him to tilt the steering wheel 
up when he needs to get in, or out, of his car. The petitioner 
tried to move the seat in the van back, but it would not move back 
far enough in order for him to slide into the seat easily. The 
petitioner complained to his supervisor, John Hutchinson, regarding 
the fact that his stomach nearly rested on the steering wheel, and 
he requested that the adjustable tracks for the seat be moved back. 
Per Monte Keele, the transportation program manager for the senior 
citizen transport, the adjustment of the van, as requested by the 
petitioner, could not be easily or quickly accomplished, because 
the van was actually owned by the state, and not the county. 
Therefore, per Keele, it would have been a complicated process to 
get authorization to make adjustments on the van. 
The petitioner drove the Ford van, with plenty of room 
around the driver seat, from May through October 1994, with no new 
problems developing in his feet. However, when he was assigned the 
less spacious Dodge van in November 1994, the petitioner stated 
that this caused his feet to rub against his shoes excessively when 
he had to twist his way in and out of the seat. He stated that he 
would twist to the left to get out of the van and then apparently 
to the right as he got into the van. He attempted to demonstrate 
at hearing how his feet were positioned as he did this. This 
demonstration appeared to show the inside of his foot pressed 
against the floor, but the petitioner's testimony regarding what 
part of his foot was rubbing was fairly unclear. Per the 
petitioner, this became a particular problem on "Thanksgiving 
crunch day." On this day, which the petitioner approximated to be 
November 17, 1994, there was a special function or meal at the 
senior center, related to the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday, which 
was very popular with the seniors. As a result, the petitioner 
stated that he estimated he transported 20-25 seniors on that day, 
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resulting in him needing to get in and out of the van approximately 
50 times. Neither party submitted any records for November 17, 
1994 and thus there is no documentary evidence to refer to with 
respect to the number of seniors transported on that day. 
The petitioner recalls noticing blisters just below the 
great toe on each foot, on the sole of the foot, on November 18, 
1994. He stated that he did not go to the VA until the following 
Monday, November 21, 1994. However, there are no VA records 
whatsoever for this time frame in Exhibit D-l (no records from 
August of 1994 until December of 1994). The closest records in 
time to November 21, 1994 are the admit records for the stay from 
December 12, 1994 through December 24, 1994. Those records reflect 
that the petitioner was admitted for right foot cellulitis and 
osteomyelitis of the hallux of the first metatarsal. The records 
reflect that the petitioner first noticed sores right underneath 
the right metatarsophalangeal joint 2 weeks prior to admission 
(approximately November 29, 1994). There was an initial incision 
and drainage procedure performed at the hospital on December 13, 
1994, with complete amputation of the right great toe on December 
22, 1994. The post-surgical pathology report noted that there were 
areas of bony erosion identified, with extensive soft tissue 
ulceration and necrosis, likely representing acute osteomyelitis. 
The petitioner was discharged on December 24, 1994, but he was 
under home nursing care for the next 8 months following the 
discharge. He was on IV antibiotics for approximately one month 
following the surgery and then had daily nursing care for the wound 
and his diabetes, until approximately mid-August 1995. He also had 
3 to 5 follow-up visits per month with the podiatry clinic. 
In late April 1995 or May 1995, there was apparent worsening 
of the left foot ulcer. The petitioner did do some very minimal 
volunteer work at a local bank at that time, but he was unable to 
make any connection himself with that work and the worsening of the 
left foot ulcer. The petitioner indicated that he felt that he had 
gone off his anti-biotics at that time and that this was the cause 
of the ulcer worsening. An X-ray done on May 22, 1995, was read to 
show obvious interval development of osteomyelitis, involving the 
region of the first metatarsal phalangeal joint, with concern for 
necrotizing fascitis. A June 8, 1995 X-ray was read to show 
progressive destruction and fragmentation of the first metatarsal 
head and base of the proximal joint, with associated periosteal 
reaction and air in the soft tissues, consistent with 
osteomyelitis. The left great toe was amputated on June 13, 1995. 
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The petitioner spoke with the county regarding returning to 
work, after he was released to do so by his treating physician in 
late August 1995. The petitioner had some conditions that he 
wanted met before he returned to work. He indicated that he wanted 
to drive a van with sufficient room in it, or where the seat could 
be moved back, so that he didn't have to wedge himself into the 
seat as he had to do in November 1994. The petitioner also 
requested to have a volunteer assigned to him, so that he would not 
have to get in and out of the van so much to help the seniors. The 
county agreed to provide the accommodations requested by the 
petitioner. Keele, the transportation manager, decided that it 
would be easier to have the petitioner drive a different van than 
to try to refit the state van that he had problems with. 
Therefore, the petitioner was simply assigned a van that did not 
have the problems the state van had. Betty Gikiu, a volunteer, was 
assigned to go along with the petitioner on trips to assist the 
seniors in and out of the van. She did not go on every trip with 
the petitioner, but went along most of the time. 
There is only one notable medical record between September 
1, 1995, when the petitioner returned to work (just 10.85 hours per 
week on the average, at $6.60/hour) and when the petitioner again 
developed an ulcer in November 1995. That record is a November 1, 
1995 record where the podiatrist noted that orthotics the 
petitioner was wearing were under the wrong feet. He reversed them 
with the petitioner noting that they felt more comfortable as a 
result. The "Thanksgiving crunch day," November 16, 1995, again 
came around and the petitioner believes that he again transported 
2 0-25 people on that day. The respondent disagrees with this 
estimate, based on Exhibits D-2 and D-3. Those exhibits are 
worksheets that the petitioner used to determine which seniors 
needed to be picked up on several days in November 1995. 
Per the exhibits, apparently different seniors went to the 
center on different days of the week. Thirteen seniors are listed 
for the Mondays in November 1995, ten seniors are listed for the 
Tuesdays, and twelve seniors are listed for the Wednesday pickups. 
Although D-2 contains the petitioner's worksheets, there are no 
handwritten markings on the Tuesday and Wednesday sheets. The 
petitioner stated he did not actually work on the Tuesdays in 
November 1995 and could not recall if he worked on the Wednesdays 
of that month. On the worksheets for the Thursday pickups, there 
are a total of 18 seniors listed and there are check marks after 
most of the names in the columns for the first (the 2nd) and second 
(the 9th) Thursdays of November 1995. At hearing, the petitioner 
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was asked whether these check marks indicated that the senior was 
picked up. The petitioner indicated that the sheets were not 
official records and that the check marks did not necessarily 
indicate which seniors were picked up and which were not. At any 
rate, there are no check marks at all for Thursday November 16, 
1995, the date on which the petitioner feels he again developed an 
ulcer related to driving the van. For the Monday pickups only, the 
exhibit is the apparently more official county record, indicating 
just those seniors actually picked up. That record indicates 
thirteen seniors on the list, but just eight actually picked up. 
Based on the foregoing information conveyed by Exhibits D-2 
and D-3, the county contends that, on November 16, 1995, the 
petitioner actually picked up less than the total 18 seniors that 
are listed for Thursday pick-up on Exhibit D-2. In addition, based 
on the testimony of Betty Gikiu, the respondent contends that the 
petitioner had at least some help with getting the seniors in and 
out of the van on November 16, 1995 (she indicated that she did 
help the petitioner with this, but he also helped, and got in and 
out of the van, as a result) . The county does not contest that the 
petitioner again had to drive the more cramped state Dodge van on 
that day, due to the fact that the van assignments got accidentally 
mixed up. The VA ulcer evaluation work sheet for November 20, 
1995, indicates that the petitioner had developed a large ulcer 
just below the remaining toes of the right foot. On November 27, 
1995, the ulcer was debrided. The December 27, 1995 VA record 
notes a neuropathic ulcer on the right foot, in existence for 
several weeks. The next record is dated March 6, 199 6 and is a 
handwritten note prepared by the petitioner's treating podiatrist, 
Dr. M. Moritz. The note indicates that the petitioner had an open 
wound to the right plantar foot (sub 2nd & 3rd metatarsal 
phalangeal joint) and that it resulted from the petitioner driving 
a van for the aging center. It states that the petitioner broke it 
open when he stood up and pivoted on the right foot. 
The petitioner was admitted to the VA Hospital from March 
26, 1996 through March 29, 1996, during which he underwent surgery 
for a transmetatarsal amputation of the right foot along with a 
resection of 1 cm of the achilles tendon just proximal to the 
insertion site. The discharge summary for this admission indicates 
that the petitioner had a non-healing ulcer, in the area in 
question, for 12-16 mouths prior to the admission (i.e. since 
December 1994). It notes that radiographs confirmed spread of the 
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infection to the bone including the head and shaft of the third 
metatarsal. Per the summary, this finding caused the physician to 
decide on the amputation. There are no further VA medical records 
dated more recent than the discharge summary. 
On April 9, 1996, Dr. R. K. Thueson, an internist, examined 
the petitioner, at the request of the respondent. Dr. Thueson 
concludes in his report that the direct cause of the petitioner's 
foot problems is his diabetes (2 0-year history, with a requirement 
for insulin during the last 6 years) and not his driving 
assignments. Dr. Thueson notes that the petitioner has 
"significant end organ functions" resulting from his diabetes, 
including neuropathy, decreased peripheral vascular flow and 
impotence. In addition, Dr. Thueson notes that the petitioner has 
several risk factors which would aggravate his neuropathy and 
diminished vascular flow, including a history of alcohol abuse and 
a 120 pack year history of cigarette smoking. Dr. Thueson notes 
that foot problems are a common complication for those suffering 
diabetes. Dr. Thueson notes that it is unlikely that assigning a 
different vehicle to the petitioner would have had much bearing on 
the outcome of his diabetic foot problems. Finally, Dr. Thueson 
concludes that the all of the surgeries performed on the petitioner 
were necessary due to the petitioner's underlying diabetic foot 
condition. 
It should be noted that the petitioner was unable to outline 
the benefits he sought in relation to his workers compensation 
claim. Certainly, all his medical care has been, and will be, 
taken care of by the VA, and because of his relatively low wage and 
minimal work hours, plus his return to work in late 1995, he would 
have only a very minimal temporary total claim. He was off work 
altogether from December 8, 1994 through August 31, 1995. He 
worked a reduced 10.85 hours per week, at $6.60/hour from September 
1, 1995 through December 7, 1995 and then was off altogether from 
December 8, 1995 through May 23, 1996. He currently is working 
again 20 hours per week, as of May 24, 1996, albeit at a lower wage 
of $4.75/hour. The low average weekly wage associated with his 
claim ($132.00/week) would also result in a fairly low permanent 
impairment claim. The petitioner indicated that he had concern for 
his continued mobility and the possible need to revamp his vehicle 
in the future to allow him to continue driving. However, the 
petitioner was not clear on exactly why this would be necessary and 
just indicated he wanted to assure that unexpected expenses, that 
might arise due to his foot problems, will get paid, as some are 
not paid, like the cost of maintaining special shoes needed as a 
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result of his amputations. The petitioner was advised that workers 
compensation provides for just a few very specific benefits and 
might not cover some of the unexpected expenses that might ensue 
related to his foot problems, especially considering that at least 
some of his foot problems are the result of a pre-existing 
condition. 
MEDICAL PANEL REPORT: 
The panel consisted of Chairman, Dr. M. Thomas and 
panelmember, Dr. D. Clarke. The panel concluded that there was no 
medical causal connection between the petitioner's work as a van 
driver in 1994 and 1995 and the development of the foot ulcers and 
amputations later necessary. The panel concluded that there were 
a number of pre-existing factors that led to the development of the 
ulcers, including, long-standing poorly regulated diabetes, an 
extensive history of alcohol use, obesity, smoking and 
hypercholesteremia. The panel noted that, at the time that he was 
hired as a van driver, the petitioner would have had a significant 
impairment rating for his type II diabetes, due to the fact that he 
was insulin dependent and had a history of complicating symptoms. 
Finally, the panel noted that there was no good reason to believe 
that there was any significant undue trauma to the feet based on 
the description of the work duties offered to the panel in the 
ALJ's summary. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ adopts the findings of the medical panel to resolve 
the medical causal controversy established between the opinions of 
Dr. Moritz and Dr. Thueson. The panel report restates Dr. 
Thueson's conclusions that the petitioner had many pre-existing 
factors that led to the development of osteomyelitis and the 
resulting amputations. In addition, the panel report restates Dr. 
Thueson's conclusions that the petitioner's work as a van driver, 
even in the cramped van he had to use on one occasion in 1994 and 
one occasion in 1995, did not contribute to the need to accomplish 
the foot amputations. Only Dr. Moritz's short one-paragraph 
statement indicates any medical causal connection between the 
petitioner's work and his eventual need to have the partial 
amputations. In light of the fact that it is unclear whether Dr. 
Moritz had a full understanding of the petitioner's extensive pre-
existing history of risk factors and in light of the fact that the 
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Dr. Thueson and the medical panel clearly had this history and 
relied upon it significantly in making their conclusions, the ALJ 
prefers to adopt the majority medical opinion stated by Dr. Thueson 
and the medical panel. The ALJ finds that this conclusion is 
underscored by the findings noted above, taken primarily from the 
medical records, documenting clearly the petitioner's extensive 
history of diabetes and other contributory risk factors. The ALJ 
also finds the conclusion regarding the lack of contribution from 
the work to be logical, considering the difficulty in understanding 
how any significant trauma occurred, base on the mechanics of the 
work exposure testified to by the petitioner (outlined above). 
Based on the foregoing conclusions, the ALJ finds that the 
petitioner's claim for workers compensation benefits is non-
compensable due to failure to establish medical cause. The ALJ 
will not formally address legal cause, as the failure to establish 
medical cause makes it unnecessary to do so. Failure of either 
medical or legal cause makes the claim non-compensable. Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) . The ALJ will note 
that the higher legal cause standard would apply, based on the 
clear and significant contributory pre-existing conditions. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petitioner's claim for 
workers compensation benefits is dismissed with prejudice due to 
non-compensability. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Division of 
Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying 
in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless 
received by the Division of Adjudication within thirty (3 0) days of 
the date hereof, this Order shall be final and not subject to 
review or appeal. If a Motion for Review is received by the 
Division of Adjudication within thirty (3 0) days of the date 
hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed within 
fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion for 
Review by the Division of Adjudication in accordance with U.C.A. 
Section 63-46b-12. A Motion for Review will be decided by the 
Commissioner of the Labor Commission unless any of the parties 
requests that the Motion for Review be decided by the Appeals Board 
in accordance with U.C.A. Section 34A-1-205 within thirty (30) days 
of the date hereof, or in case of a party responding to the Motion 
for Review, the request must be made within 2 0 days of the date of 
the Motion for Review was filed with the Division of Adjudication. 
DATED this 14th day of October, 1997. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
WILNER BLAKELEY, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, * 
* Case No. 96-0413 
Defendant * 
Wilner Blakeley asks the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's 
denial of Mr. Blakeley 's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Was Mr. Blakeley's work for Salt Lake County the medical cause of the injuries for which 
he now seeks workers' compensation benefits? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
After having reviewed the record in this matter in light of the points raised by Mr. Blakeley's 
motion for review, the Labor Commission concludes that the ALJ's findings of fact are supported 
by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
An individual claiming workers' compensation benefits must prove that his or her work is 
the medical cause of the injury for which benefits are sought In this case, the ALJ referred the issue 
to an impartial medical panel which examined Mr. Blakeley, reviewed his medical history, and 
concluded that his work was not the medical cause of his injury. 
The Labor Commission agrees with the ALJ's determination that the medical panel's report 
is persuasive on the issue of medical causation. Because Mr. Blakeley has failed to establish medical 
causation, his claim for workers' compensation benefits must be denied. 
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ORDER 
The Labor Commission affirms the ALJ's decision and denies Mr. Blakeley's motion for 
review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this /T^day of March, 1998. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days 
of the date of this order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of 
Wilner Blakeley, Case No. 96-0413 , was mailed first class postage prepaid this / ^ d a y of March, 
1998, to the following: 
Jay L. Stone 
Deputy County Attorney 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
2001 South State Street, S-3400 
Salt Lake City Utah 84190-1200 
Wilner Blakeley 
1992 South 200 East #B626 
Salt Lake City Utah 84110 
orders\96-0413 
Sara Jen^/n 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
WILNER BLAKELEY, * 
* ORDER DENYING REQUEST 
Applicant, * FOR RECONSIDERATION 
* 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, * 
* Case No. 96-0413 
Defendant * 
Wilner Blakeley asks the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its previous decision denying 
Mr. Blakeley's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this request for reconsideration pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13 and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.O. 
DISCUSSION 
Mr. Blakeley's request for reconsideration does not set forth any basis for modification of 
the Labor Commission's previous decision. Mr. Blakeley does, however, ask the Commission to 
refer his claim for mediation under the Commission's alternative claims resolution program. 
Having once again reviewed the record in this matter, the Labor Commission remains of the 
opinion that Mr. Blakeley is ineligible for workers' compensation benefits, for the reasons set forth 
in the Commission's previous decision. 
As to Mr. Blakeley's request for mediation, the Commission finds no issues presented by Mr. 
Blakeley's claim that would benefit from mediation, particularly at this late stage of the proceedings. 
ORDER 
The Labor Commission reaffirms its previous decision and denies Mr. Blakeley's request for 
reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
Dated this JfcTday of April, 1998. 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
R. tee Ellertson 
Commissioner 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review 
with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of the date 
of this order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Request For Reconsideration in the 
matter of Wilner Blakeley, Case No. 96-0413 , was mailed first class postage prepaid thisJg/*Bay 
of April, 1998, to the following: 
Jay L. Stone 
Deputy County Attorney 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
2001 South State Street, S-3400 
Salt Lake City Utah 84190-1200 
Wilner Blakeley 
1992 South 200 East #B626 
Salt Lake City Utah 84110 
Sara Jensor 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
orders\96-04l3b 
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